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The Influence of a Competition on Non-Competitors 
 
Abstract 
We report a series of experimental studies that investigate the influence of a competition on non-
competitors who do not participate in it but are aware of it. Our work is highly relevant across 
many domains of social life where competitions are prevalent, as it is typical in a competition 
that the competitors are far outnumbered by these non-competitors. In our field experiment 
involving pay-what-you-want entrance at a German zoo (N = 22,886), customers who were 
aware of a competition over entrance payments, but did not participate in it, paid more than 
customers who were unaware of the competition. Further experiments provide confirmatory and 
process evidence for this contagion effect, showing that it is driven by heightened social 
comparison motivation due to mere awareness of the competition. Moreover, we find evidence 
that the reward level for the competitors could moderate the contagion effect on the non-
competitors. Even if an individual does not participate in a competition, their behavior can still 
be influenced by it; and this influence can change with the characteristics of the competition in 
an intriguing way.  
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Significance Statement 
Competitions are prevalent in social life, but it is typical in a competition that the competitors are 
far outnumbered by people who do not participate in it but are aware of it. In a series of 
experimental studies, we find that the mere awareness of a competition can affect a non-
competitor’s performance in similar tasks. In our field experiment involving pay-what-you-want 
entrance at a German zoo, customers who were aware of a competition over entrance payments, 
but did not participate in it, paid more than customers who were unaware of it. Further 
experiments provide confirmatory evidence for this contagion effect, and suggest that it is due to 
non-competitors becoming motivated to act more competitively upon being aware of the 
competition. 
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From workplace to classrooms, from social media to sports fields, competitions are ever-
present in social life. The recent rise in gamification strategies (1) in areas such as education, 
crowdsourcing, and marketing, further popularizes attempts to motivate people by engaging 
them in competitions. However, such initiatives may not always induce full or majority 
participation among the target population: it is typical in a competition that the competing 
individuals are far outnumbered by people who do not participate in it but are aware of it. 
Consider a fundraising event organizer who charges attendees on a pay-what-you-want basis for 
entry to the event, and in addition advertises a voluntary competition with rewards for the top 
donors. If the competition has a participation fee or requests personal contact information for 
participation, many attendees may not enter into it. What impact might the competition still have 
on the entrance payments of these non-competing attendees?  
Alternatively, consider a business organization in which two senior partners vie for the 
role of the managing partner. It is pertinent for the firm’s board of directors to promote the senior 
partner with the better performance. It might then be natural to expect that the two senior 
partners, when told they are in consideration for the promotion, would respond competitively 
with improved effort and performance at work. Would the other staff, who are aware of the 
competition but are not participating in it themselves, be influenced by this competition in their 
own office work?  
A third example comes from the fact that, in innovative market places, competition is 
often encouraged and winners are rewarded by public bodies. If these incentives are targeted at 
only a few leading players, what influence could they have on the rest of the industry?  
In these cases, as in other similar circumstances, could the competition have any power in 
influencing the non-competitors? Could simply making people aware of an ongoing competition 
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produce a contagion effect on their behavior? If yes, the design and public communications of 
competitions should factor in influences on non-competitors too. These questions highly warrant 
investigations and are the central objectives of the present article, in which we report affirmative 
evidence from a large-scale field experiment and three follow-up studies.  
Note that, throughout this article, we define competitors as individuals who are 
performing a task with the knowledge that the best-performing individual(s) among themselves 
will receive rewards; the rewards can be material (e.g., cash) or symbolic (e.g., recognition by 
the organizer). In the context of a specific competition, non-competitors can broadly mean 
anyone who is not a competitor; here, we use the term as a shorthand to particularly refer to 
individuals who are aware of the ongoing competition and are performing an identical or similar 
task as the competitors, but without the competition rewards as incentives. Non-competitors in 
this sense abound in many scenarios, as in the examples above.  
Lastly, the term contagion as used here should be distinguished from its use in the 
context of social contagion or social influence (2-6). Social contagion is largely about how 
people might be affected by observations of the expressions or behavior of others. Here, the term 
“contagion” refers specifically to any behavioral impact of the mere awareness of an ongoing 
competition on non-competitors’ task performance, without any information about the actual 
behavior of the competitors. The designs of our studies do not involve communicating 
information about competitors’ performance – or behavior in general – to the non-competitors. 
The non-competitors in our studies are only informed that there is a competition; in other words, 
they are merely aware of the competition. Yet we still obtain supporting evidence for the 
contagion effect.  
Theoretical Development 
6 
 
There has been substantial research on behavior in competitions, from works in the early 
and mid-20th century (7,8) to recent studies in psychology, economics, and management (9-11). 
These studies have largely focused on competitors’ behavior and how it is motivated by social 
comparison – the human tendency to self-evaluate by comparing oneself with others (12).  For 
example, Garcia et al. (10) proposed a general model in which various situational and individual 
factors could influence social comparison concerns, which could in turn influence competitive 
behavior. But the model was proposed for individuals who are directly engaged in competitions; 
this and other related models have rarely, if ever, touched on the influence of a competition on 
non-competitors.  
Here, in a departure from the theorizing in previous literature, we surmise that the 
awareness of a competition can induce in non-competitors perceptions of rivalry among 
competitors, if only in a vicarious form: “sensing the heat of the game” despite not participating 
in it. Perceptions of rivalry can be understood as the consciousness that the competitors would 
strive towards overtaking each other’s competition performance, in order to achieve the goal of 
winning the competition (9). A major driver of such competitive activities is social comparison. 
Perceptions of rivalry might then also induce in non-competitors a heightened social comparison 
motivation, such as by making social comparison more salient (see the General Discussion for 
further details). The result is increased effort and improved performance among non-competitors, 
and hence the contagion effect.  
In the following sections, we report a series of experimental studies that establish positive 
evidence for the contagion, as well as process evidence in the support of our theoretical 
development. 
Study 1: Contagion in Monetary Payment 
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Study 1 is a large-scale field experiment that provides evidence for the existence of the 
posited contagion effect in a monetary payment context. The experiment involved pay-what-you-
want (PWYW) entrance at a German zoo. Under PWYW pricing, all customers face the decision 
of how much to pay (which can be zero or any positive amount) for the target product (good or 
service). PWYW can be a tool by which we can study how people’s economic decisions can be 
affected by behavioral factors, whether situational or individual (13-16). Study 1 leverages this 
possibility by superimposing a customer competition over PWYW pricing. Our setup 
demonstrates how customers who were aware of the competition, but opted to not participate in 
it, might still be influenced by the very existence of that competition, as manifested in those 
customers’ monetary payment under PWYW.  
We also examine the robustness of our hypothesized contagion effect across competitions 
with different framing and reward structures – which can be subsumed under the situational 
factor of incentive structures in models of competitive behavior such as (10). It is plausible that, 
if the contagion effect exists at all, it might be significant only when the competition is very 
explicitly worded as it is communicated to the non-competitors; or that the reward structure 
needs to give the impression of fierce competition, such as having only one prize for the very 
best performer. Our experimental design addresses these possible boundary conditions. 
The major findings are summarized in Table 1. In the control condition, the mean 
PWYW payment at the entrance is 5.42 Euros, which is predictably lower than the regular adult 
admission fee of 14 Euros. But the fact that the mean payment is non-negligibly positive, as 
opposed to zero (as standard economic reasoning might predict), is consistent with previous 
empirical findings that people often make a positive payment under PWYW. Also, the mean 
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PWYW payment among competing customers in every treatment condition is significantly 
higher than the mean payment under the control condition.  
What is most surprising, but in agreement with the contagion effect of a competition on 
non-competitors, is that the mean payment of non-competing customers in every treatment 
conditions is significantly higher than the control condition mean. The overall mean payment of 
non-competing customers is 5.76 Euros (s.d. = 2.99 Euros, 95% CI: [5.69,5.82])), which is 0.34 
Euros higher than the mean payment in the control condition, representing a 6.27% increase that 
is statistically significant (t(21,232)=8.43, P<0.01). As noted in Table 1, the same conclusions 
hold for pairwise t-tests comparing each treatment condition with the control condition.  
On the surface, our results are subject to several potential confounding factors that are 
peculiar to this field setting. They are related to the non-competitors possibly feeling guilty or 
inferring that the zoo needed to raise funds, as well as more general self-selection issues. In the 
SI Appendix, we discuss why the design of our study and our observations from the field do not 
lend support to the first two confounding factors. But the third confounding factor, namely self-
selection, is a potential concern. It is thus important to identify the contagion effect when 
participation in competition is exogenously assigned. We address these issues in Study 2A. 
Study 2A: Contagion in the Performance of a Real Effort Task  
Study 2A provides confirmatory evidence for the existence of the contagion effect in a 
more controlled experimental setting. In the design of this study, we assign competition 
participation exogenously and randomly to study participants, and therefore the self-selection 
confounding factor in the setting of Study 1 is not applicable. Our primary purpose is to observe 
whether non-competing participants’ performance scores in a task change (resulting in a within-
subjects difference) once they are informed that some other participants are competing over the 
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same task. Our second purpose is to demonstrate the contagion effect in a highly different 
context from Study 1’s monetary payment. Instead of monetary payment, participants in Study 
2A are asked to perform a well-defined real effort task conducted through a computer interface. 
The design consists of six rounds of the task. The first four rounds are identical for all 
participants; but in round 5-6, participants in the treatment conditions are informed that they 
have been randomly assigned into a 50-person group, half of which are further randomly 
assigned to be competitors for a cash reward (manipulated at two levels across conditions) while 
the other half are assigned to be non-competitors. 
In our data analysis, we divide the six rounds into three blocks of two rounds each. We 
then calculate, for the control condition and then for each role in each treatment condition, 
descriptive statistics of the performance scores. The results are summarized in Table 2. As is 
apparent from the table, there is a learning effect over the first four rounds in all conditions and 
with both roles in the treatment conditions. But there is a plateauing in the control condition from 
block 2 (round 3-4) to block 3 (round 5-6), so that there is no significant difference in 
performance scores over those two blocks. By contrast, performance scores increase significantly 
among non-competitors, once they are informed about the competition, at both reward levels in 
the treatment conditions. Unlike the competitors, non-competitors have no incentives to perform 
differently in round 5-6, when they know about an ongoing competition that does not involve 
them. Thus, we have obtained evidence for the contagion effect in the treatment conditions 
across both reward levels. Lastly, as might be expected, performance scores increase 
significantly between blocks 2 and 3 among competitors in every treatment condition.  
Since all participants went through the same four initial rounds in the experiment, 
potential between-subjects effects in round 5-6 might have been diminished by the identical 
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initial experience. But pairwise t-test comparisons still reveal significant differences in 
performance scores over round 5-6 between the control condition and all but one of the treatment 
conditions, with marginally significant difference for the remaining treatment condition (see 
Table 2). Moreover, all pairwise t-test comparisons of mean performance scores in block 3 
among the treatment conditions yield P > 0.1. Lastly, between-subjects differences in any of the 
first two blocks between the control and any treatment condition are all non-significant (P > 0.1 
in all relevant t-tests). These results, wherever pertaining to non-competitors, lend further 
support to the contagion effect.   
Study 2B: The Necessity of the Awareness of a Competition; Eliminating Alternative 
Mechanisms 
Study 2B provides evidence that the awareness of a competition is necessary for the 
contagion effect in the two previous studies; for this purpose, Study 2B has an experimental 
design that closely follows that of Study 2A, except that there is no competition.  
Study 2B is important, as the previously observed contagion is subject to explanations via 
alternative mechanisms that do not require the awareness of a competition. In the SI Appendix, 
we propose, in detail, several examples of such alternative mechanisms; they are respectively 
related to group dynamics, the presence of an additional incentive, and a potential anchoring 
effect induced by non-competitors hypothesizing higher performance levels among competitors. 
To address these concerns, the design of Study 2B involves an incentive scheme in place of a 
competition. A participant of the scheme will be entered into a lottery draw to win a cash reward 
if his/her performance scores reaches a threshold. As in Study 2A, participation roles are 
randomly assigned within each 50-person groups - with half of the group being assigned to be 
participants and the other half being assigned to be non-participants. We therefore maintain the 
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group assignment, the presence of an additional incentive, and the possibility of an induced 
anchoring effect among non-participants; the only change is that there is no competition. If we 
observe no contagion effect in Study 2B, we would obtain evidence that the contagion effect in 
previous studies is necessitated by the awareness of a competition, and none of the alternative 
mechanisms proposed in the SI Appendix could account for it. 
We use a similar data analysis approach as in Study 2A by dividing the six rounds into 
three blocks of two rounds each, and focus on the presence or absence of within-subjects effects. 
The block-by-block descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3. There is a learning effect 
over the first four rounds in all but one of the conditions. Once the incentive scheme is 
introduced in block 3 (round 5-6), there was – as noted in Table 3 – a statistically significant 
improvement in performance among participants in the scheme, when the reward is sufficiently 
high at $10. But otherwise, there is no significant improvement in performance, in particular 
among non-participants of the scheme (P > 0.25 in all within-subjects t-test comparisons 
between block 2 and block 3), unlike among the non-competitors in Study 2A; in fact, non-
participants of the scheme perform slightly worse on average upon learning about the scheme 
and their non-participating role. In addition, we find no significant differences between any 
condition in Study 2B and the control condition in Study 2A (P > 0.5 in all pairwise t-test 
comparisons). To sum up, despite maintaining similar group assignment design and reward 
levels as in Study 2A, the incentive scheme in Study 2B does not lead to any significant 
contagion effect. Study 2B thus provides support for the fact that the contagion effect in Study 1 
and 2 is necessitated by non-competitors being aware of a competition. 
Study 3: Further Process Evidence; Contagion Moderated by Competition Reward 
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Study 3 has two major objectives. First, it aims to provide more direct process evidence 
for the contagion effect. The process measurements would have been highly prone to demand 
effect in Study 2A, because participants in the treatment conditions in that study would have 
experienced a change of role from round 4 to round 5. In the present study, the competition roles 
were assigned from the beginning of the study, thereby minimizing demand effect concerns.  
The second objective of Study 3 is to demonstrate how non-competitors’ performance 
could change as the competition reward increases across conditions. Since the non-competitors 
are not competing for the reward, any moderating effect of the reward level provides additional 
support for a contagion effect. In relation, we introduce a no-monetary-reward competition 
condition in the design. This serves as a clear low-end boundary of reward level; it is also 
motivated by findings from previous research (17) that symbolic social incentives, in addition to 
monetary incentives, could play a significant role in motivating task performance. 
The process evidence objective of this study is intertwined with the objective to 
demonstrate a moderating effect of the competition reward on contagion. We propose that, as the 
reward increases, non-competitors have heightened perceptions of rivalry among the 
competitors, which result in heightened social comparison motivation and more positive 
contagion. But we also conjecture that, if the reward level is sufficiently high compared with 
what the non-competing participants are receiving from the task, it can possibly induce an 
additional, counteracting reference effect (18). That is, the non-competitors compare their task 
payment with what a competitor could earn from the experiment, and perceive their task 
payment as substantially low in comparison; this perception can have a general negative impact 
on the monetary and social comparison motivational drivers of performance. At sufficiently high 
reward levels, it can possibly lead to a negative moderating effect as reward further increases.   
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Recall that, in Study 2A, reward level did not seem to moderate contagion in round 5-6, 
as non-competitors’ performance scores in round 5-6 did not differ across reward levels with 
statistical significance. But, as pointed out before, Study 2A was not primarily designed to detect 
such between-subjects effect: since all participants went through the same four initial rounds in 
the experiment, potential between-subjects effects in round 5-6 might have been diminished.  
This calls for a different design that is more conducive to detecting between-subjects 
effects. As such, Study 3 consists of four rounds of the same task as in Study 2A, but without any 
initial no-competition rounds. That is, from round 1 onwards, the participant is either a 
competitor or non-competitor, and the competition is based on the total performance score over 
all four rounds. The reward of the competition is manipulated at three levels across conditions. 
These include a $0-reward level, which is motivated by (17) as explained above. The other two 
reward levels are $0.5 and $10. They are, respectively, commensurate with and much higher than 
the typical earnings from an MTurk task with a similar duration (around 10 minutes) as the study 
(19). Moreover, the high reward level of $10 is designed to be much higher than the payment to 
non-competitors (a participation fee of $0.5), so as to facilitate the demotivating reference effect 
discussed earlier. Approximately one-third (as opposed to half in Study 2A) of the participants 
are assigned to be competitors. To give further contrast to our posited effects and process 
evidence, we also conducted a number of lottery control conditions. The design of those 
conditions closely follows the positive cash reward conditions among the competition conditions, 
except that, where there would be a competition, in its place is a lottery in which every lottery 
participant had an equal probability to receive the reward in addition to the participation fee. 
Table 4 lists the mean total performance score in each condition; see also the top panels 
of Fig. 1. We first analyze how non-competitors’ performance in the competition conditions 
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changes according to the reward level, and find an inverted-U pattern that is consistent with our 
conjectured moderation effects of the reward level on contagion: when the reward is low (reward 
= $0.5), the performance of non-competitors is higher than when the reward is nil (reward = $0; 
t(169)=2.37, P =0.019), as well as when the reward is high (reward = $10; t(170)=2.33, P 
=0.021). Also, competitors’ performance scores across reward levels has a U-shaped pattern that 
is consistent with previous research such as (12) (see the SI Appendix). Meanwhile, in the lottery 
control conditions, the lottery itself does not create differences in scores by participation role or 
reward level. A 2(lottery reward) × 2(lottery participation role) between-subjects ANOVA does 
not yield any significant main effects or interaction (P > 0.25 in all cases). Consistent with 
similar results from Study 2B, there is no contagion effect in the lottery control conditions. 
Process Evidence. In all conditions, we administer three self-report questions to all 
participants at the end of the experiment. These questions are: “How hard did you try?” (a 
measure of effort), “To what extent were you motivated by the payment you could receive?” (a 
measure of monetary motivation) and “To what extent were you motivated by a wish to score 
higher than other participants?” (a measure of social comparison motivation). Every question is 
to be answered over a seven-point response scale. Analysis on the self-report measures reveals 
that, when the reward level increases from nil ($0) to low ($0.5), non-competitors’ effort 
increases significantly (t(169)=2.75, P <0.01), while their social comparison motivation 
increases marginally (t(169)=1.71, P =0.089). When the reward level increases from low ($0.5) 
to high ($10), non-competitors’ effort decreases significantly (t(170)=-2.59, P = 0.011) and so 
does their social comparison motivation (t(170)=-2.09, P = 0.039). It thus appears that the non-
competitors’ social comparison motivation changes with the reward level of the competition. 
These changes follow a similar pattern as their effort as well as performance scores.  
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General Discussion 
In investigating the influence of a competition on non-competitors, the present research 
dives into important but underexplored domains of a major area of human behavior. We provide 
evidence that the awareness of a competition leads to heightened social comparison motivation 
among the non-competitors, resulting in the contagion effect.  
We conjecture that the detailed psychological mechanisms behind this phenomenon could 
consist of two stages. In the first stage, the mere awareness of a competition induces in non-
competitors perceptions of rivalry among competitors, even if only in a vicarious form. The 
second stage possibly consists of two types of psychological effects. One is the activation of 
mental representations – such as imageries or ideas – related to competition. This then leads to a 
heightened social comparison motivation as the result of a priming effect. The priming effect can 
make non-competitors act as if they were competitors, and can produce significant behavioral 
influence; see (20) and the studies discussed therein. Meanwhile, non-competitors’ perceptions 
of rivalry could also lead to a vicarious form of competitive arousal. As defined in (9) and (21), 
competitive arousal is an emotional state that can arise during competitive interaction; it is highly 
irrational and does not require economic interests, or actual participation in a competition, to be 
effective. Thus it is plausible that a competition can induce competitive arousal even for non-
competitors, which then heightens the non-competitors’ social comparison motivation.  
In sum, the awareness of an ongoing competition can induce perceptions of rivalry 
among the non-competitors, which might then lead to possible priming effect and vicarious 
competitive arousal, which could coexist and could both cause a heightened social comparison 
motivation. The heightened social comparison motivation then results in the contagion effect. 
These possible intermediate processes merit future research.  
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The contagion effect we investigate has general relevance in many social domains in the 
real world. Attempts to motivate people by competitions, as often seen in gamification strategies, 
might involve only a limited number of competitors. Yet, competitions can influence competitors 
as well as a potentially much larger number of non-competing individuals who are aware of 
them. It is therefore important to consider these non-competitors when designing competitions. 
For instance, as we have shown, higher rewards might motivate competitors more, but can also 
become demotivating to non-competitors.  
Non-competitors can be important to the success of a fundraising event, a company’s 
productivity, a team’s strength, or a classroom’s progress. Just because an individual does not 
take part in a competition does not mean they are unaffected by the social comparison dynamics 
created by it. Our work provides evidence that there can indeed be an influence, and moreover, 
the influence can change in an intriguing way according to the characteristics of the competition. 
Materials and Methods 
Study 1. The field experiment took place at a zoo in a major German city from mid-
December 2013 to early January 2014, when PWYW entrance was offered to all customers. Prior 
to the experiment, ethical clearance was obtained from RWTH Aachen University, the second 
author’s institution at that time; the experiment was exempt from informed consent at the 
institution. Four treatment conditions, each a competition over entrance payments, took place 
simultaneously during part of this period; the remainder of the PWYW period constituted the 
control condition for comparison. Every customer in the treatment conditions was randomly 
assigned to one condition and did not know about the existence of the other conditions. The 
treatment conditions differ according to whether the competition is presented as a reward scheme 
in neutral wordings, or explicitly presented as a contest among customers; and, whether there are 
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one or seven prizes (see the SI Appendix). The total value of the prizes is controlled across 
treatment conditions to be equivalent to one annual family pass to the zoo (worth 145 Euros) plus 
400-Euros worth of Amazon Gift Cards. 
In every treatment condition, the customer was given a short, one-page questionnaire at 
the entrance to the zoo. The questionnaire begins with information about the relevant 
competition. The customer was then requested to state whether he/she would like to participate 
in the competition; if the customer opted to be a competitor, he/she would need to provide 
contact details in the questionnaire. Regardless of the reply to the question about participation in 
the competition, the customer then needed to write down how much he/she would like to pay for 
their entrance to the zoo. If the customer was accompanying one or more children, he/she would 
also need to state the additional price(s) paid for them.  In the control condition, the 
questionnaire did not mention any competition, but began directly with the request to state 
payments for entrance. In all conditions, the customer was also asked to state whether he/she was 
visiting the zoo for the first time during the period of the experiment, as well as their gender. 
After completing the questionnaire, the customer took it to the admission counter, and paid the 
stated amounts on the questionnaire. Note that the non-competing customers in the treatment 
conditions were not informed about the payments of competing customers. Moreover, the 
winners of the competitions were only announced after the PWYW period was over. 
Study 2A. We conducted Study 2A in an Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
environment following commonly accepted standards of practice (22). After excluding 
participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the observations of 557 participants 
are included in the study (out of an initial number of 720 participants), including 352 (63.20%) 
females and 205 (36.80%) males. Most (434, or 77.92%) of the participants were aged between 
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25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was obtained from Cambridge Judge 
Business School, the first author’s institution. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants at the beginning of the study using an online form. 
The experimental task (see the SI Appendix) is an adaptation from (23) using the 
Qualtrics interface. In the task, the participant is presented with 60 identical sliders on the 
computer screen; each slider is positioned at 0 on a scale with markings that range from 0 to 100. 
The task is to move, by dragging or clicking the computer mouse, as many of these sliders as 
possible from the starting position at 0 to exactly 50, the mid-point of the scale, within one 
minute and 15 seconds. The participant’s performance score in the task is the number of sliders 
(out of 60) that he/she has positioned at the mid-point of the scale at the end of the task. The 
experimental design consists of one control condition and eight treatment conditions across 
which competition context, competition role, and competition reward are manipulated (see the SI 
Appendix for further discussion). In all conditions, participants are informed at the start that they 
would be paid a fixed participation fee of $0.5. They are also informed that the study consists of 
two sections, namely Section A to be followed by Section B.  
Section A is identical in all conditions, and consists of four rounds of the slider task. 
Participants in all conditions are fully informed about the tasks in Section B at the beginning of 
Section B, but not before. In the control condition, Section B consists of two more rounds of the 
slider task with no additional incentives. In the treatment conditions, the two sections are the 
within-subjects competition context manipulations of the experiment: at the beginning of Section 
B, every participant is informed that he/she is randomly matched with 49 other participants to 
form a 50-person group; they are then informed that half of their group are assigned to compete 
over their total performance scores. Within the same group, the competing participant with the 
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highest total performance score among competing participants would be the winner and could 
receive a monetary reward; ties would be settled by a coin toss. The remaining half of the 
participants are fully informed about the competition, but are assigned to be non-competitors. 
The assignment of competitors and non-competitors forms the between-subjects manipulation of 
competition role. Lastly, to examine the robustness of our hypothesized contagion effect, we 
vary the competition cash reward level between $0.5 (low) and $10 (high) across treatment 
conditions. These form the between-subjects manipulation of competition reward. 
Study 2B. We conducted Study 2B over MTurk following the same standards of practice 
as in Study 2A. After excluding participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the 
observations of 328 participants are included in the study (out of an initial number of 400 
participants), including 196 (59.76%) females and 132 (40.24%) males. Most (248, or 75.61%) 
of the participants were aged between 25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was 
obtained from Cambridge Judge Business School, the first author’s institution. Informed consent 
was obtained from all participants at the beginning of the study using an online form. 
Study 2B closely follows the six-round slider task design of the treatment conditions in 
Study 2A. But, instead of a competition and a random assignment of roles into competitors and 
non-competitors in round 5-6 (Section B), there is an incentive scheme in that section without 
any competitive elements, and a random assignment of roles into participants and non-
participants of that scheme. The incentive scheme is such that, if a participant of the scheme 
achieves a total performance score of 100 (5/6 of the maximum possible score of 120) or more 
over round 5-6, he/she will be entered into a lottery in which one entrant will be randomly 
chosen to earn a pre-specified cash reward; all entrants into the lottery have an equal chance of 
winning the reward. Across conditions the cash reward is manipulated at $0.5 and $10, as with 
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the reward levels in Study 2A. We choose the threshold of 100 for the incentive scheme because, 
across the conditions in Study 2A, 100 is approximately the upper quartile among the total 
performance scores in round 5-6. As in the treatment conditions in Study 2A, study participants 
in Study 2B are informed at the start of Section B that they are randomly assigned to a 50-person 
group, half of whom are further randomly assigned to be participants of the incentive scheme. 
Study 3. We conducted Study 3 over MTurk following the same standards of practice as 
in Study 2A. After excluding participants based on attention checks and honesty checks, the 
observations of 657 participants are included in the study (out of an initial number of 805 
participants), including 356 (54.19%) females and 301 (45.81%) males. Most (491, or 74.73%) 
of the participants were aged between 25 and 54. Prior to the experiment, ethical clearance was 
obtained from Cambridge Judge Business School, the first author’s institution. Informed consent 
was obtained from all participants at the beginning of the study using an online form. Every 
participant does four rounds of the slider task for a participation fee of $0.5. In the competition 
treatment conditions, participants at every level of competition reward ($0 versus $0.5 versus 
$10) are informed that approximately one-third of them are assigned to be competitors. In the 
lottery control conditions, participants at every level of lottery reward ($0.5 versus $10) are 
informed that approximately one-third of them are assigned to be lottery participants. 
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Fig. 1. Means of major dependent variables in Study 4 by cash reward level condition ($0, $0.5, 
$10) and plotted with 10% error bars. Thick and dotted lines refer to the competition (N=449) 
and lottery conditions (N=208), respectively. 
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Table 1. Main Results from Study 1: Mean Payments at Entrance (in Euros) 
 Frame: Contest 
Control 
 Competing customers Non-competing customers 
1 prize 
6.14 (3.37) [5.85,6.44]** 
N = 489 
5.68 (2.75) [5.56,5.80]** 
 N = 2,025 
5.42 (2.76) [5.37,5.47] 
N = 13,056 
7 prizes 
6.52 (4.01) [6.14,6.89]** 
 N = 440 
5.76 (3.06) [5.62,5.89]** 
 N = 1,978 
 Frame: Neutral 
 Competing customers Non-competing customers 
1 prize 
6.36 (4.42) [5.94,6.78]** 
 N = 426 
5.86 (3.04) [5.73,5.99]** 
 N = 2,101 
7 prizes 
6.37 (3.41) [5.98,6.76]** 
 N = 297 
5.72 (3.09) [5.59,5.86]** 
 N = 2,074 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The 
asterisks indicate significant differences between the mean of the corresponding treatment 
condition and the control mean according to t-tests (P < 0.01 in all comparisons). 
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Table 2. Main Results from Study 2A: Mean Performance Scores in Two-round Blocks 
 
Condition N Round 1-2 Round 3-4 Round 5-6 
Control 83 34.06 (10.87) [31.67,36.43] 37.56 (12.92) [34.74,40.38]** 38.28 (13.37) [35.36,41.20] 
Treatment:     
Competition role Competition reward     
Non-competitor 
$0.5 110 35.78 (10.57) [33.78,37.78] 39.82 (10.37) [37.86,41.78]** 42.03 (11.17) [39.92,44.14]**b 
$10 111 34.93 (11.31) [32.80,37.06] 38.84 (12.14) [36.56,41.13]** 41.41 (12.16) [39.13,43.70]**c 
Competitor 
$0.5 124 35.13 (11.87) [33.02,37.24] 38.53 (11.97) [36.40,40.66]** 41.88 (11.75) [39.79,43.97]**b 
$10 129 35.33 (11.22) [33.37,37.28] 38.20 (12.08) [36.09,40.30]** 42.73 (11.31) [40.76,44.70]**a 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The asterisks indicate significant 
differences between the mean of the current block and the previous block within the same condition/role according to paired t-tests  
(* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01). a,b,c Entry is significantly or marginally significantly different from the corresponding mean in the control 
condition according to a between-subjects t-test (a P = 0.010, b P < 0.05, c P < 0.1).  
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Table 3. Main Results from Study 2B: Mean Performance Scores In Two-round Blocks 
 
Condition N Round 1-2 Round 3-4 Round 5-6 
Participation in 
incentive scheme 
Incentive scheme 
reward 
    
Non-participant 
$0.5 77 35.06 (12.94) [32.12,38.00] 38.77 (14.01) [35.59,41.95]** 37.10 (17.08) [33.23,40.98] 
$10 77 35.55 (12.70) [32.66,38.43] 37.07 (15.53) [33.55,40.60] 36.82 (17.40) [32.87,40.77] 
Participant 
$0.5 86 35.14 (12.34) [32.49,37.78] 37.40 (14.81) [34.22,40.57]* 38.27 (15.91) [34.86,41.68] 
$10 88 32.90 (12.75) [30.20,35.61] 36.36 (13.67) [33.46,39.25]** 38.59 (14.53) [35.51,41.66]* 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The asterisks indicate significant 
differences between the mean of the current block and the previous block within the same condition/role according to paired t-tests  
(* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01).  
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Table 4. Main Results from Study 3: Mean Total Performance Scores  
 
  Reward 
  $0 $0.5 $10 
Competition 
treatment 
conditions 
Non-competitor 
123.69 (90.54)** a 
[110.87,136.52] 
N = 88 
143.55 (47.94) a,b 
[133.09,154.02] 
N = 83 
124.26 (59.39)** b 
[111.75,136.77] 
N = 89 
Competitor 
158.08 (55.57)** 
[141.95,174.22] 
N = 48 
136.60 (54.34) 
[119.88,153.33] 
N = 43 
148.29 (48.38)** 
[138.99,157.58] 
N = 98 
Lottery control 
conditions 
Non-lottery- 
participant 
NA 
136.20 (53.59) 
[123.95,148.44] 
N = 76 
136.03 (56.10) 
[122.65,149.41] 
N = 70 
Lottery participant NA 
139.68 (36.70) 
[126.22,153.14] 
N = 31 
138.32 (44.18) 
[122.12,154.53] 
N = 31 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 95% confidence intervals (CIs) in square brackets. The 
asterisks indicate significant differences between the means of competitors and non-competitors 
in the same column according to t-tests (both at P < 0.01). The superscripts “a” and “b” indicate 
significant differences in means across different reward levels according to t-tests (both at P < 
0.05).  
 
    
 
1 
 
The Influence of a Competition on Non-Competitors 
Supporting Information (SI Appendix) 
 
Further Discussion on the Studies 
Study 1. As stated in the main text, the results from Study 1 are subject to several 
potential confounding factors that are peculiar to this field setting. One potential confounding 
factor is that the non-competitors might have felt guilty and obliged to pay more because they 
had turned down the zoo’s invitation to participate in the competition. But note that the 
customers could pay whatever they liked whether they were competitors or not. In turning down 
the option to participate in the competition, the non-competitors had not shut themselves off 
from paying any amount to the zoo, nor had they compromised any moral obligations.   
Another potential confounding factor is that customers in the treatment conditions could 
have perceived the competition as a new means to raise funds, and by implication, that the zoo 
might be in dire need of revenues. Therefore, it could be argued, non-competitors would be 
motivated to pay more than they would have done without being aware of the competition. 
However, from our observations in the field, the zoo had a public image to the local population 
(who made up a large majority of its customers) of being very well funded. We find no evidence 
that the PWYW initiative or the competitions were perceived as fundraising exercises. 
A third confounding factor can be put forward based on self-selection. The policy of the zoo 
dictated that customers who entered the zoo on the days of the competitions must be entitled to 
compete. That is, any non-competitor observations could only be from customers who 
voluntarily opted out of their assigned competition. The field experiment is in fact empirically 
useful in this sense, as many competitions in real life involve voluntary participation. 
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Nevertheless, the policy also implies potential self-selection issues, as customers self-selected 
into the role of competitors or non-competitors. As stated in the main text, we address these 
issues in Study 2A – from which we obtain confirmatory evidence of the contagion effect in a 
more controlled setting, with exogenous random assignment of competition roles. 
Study 2B. Here, we propose three possible alternative mechanisms for the observed 
contagion in the two previous studies. One alternative mechanism is that the non-competitors 
might have been conscious of being assigned into one half of a group with the other half being 
the competitors. This group assignment might have increased social comparison motivations 
among the non-competitors leading to improved performance (1, 2). While the group assignment 
is part of the implementation of the experimental conditions, its potential effect is not 
necessitated, in principle, by the awareness of a competition, but by more general group 
dynamics. Another alternative mechanism is that the presence of an additional incentive among 
competitors might have created a vicarious motivating effect on non-competitors. A third 
alternative mechanism can be proposed based on an anchoring effect mechanism: the awareness 
of a competition might have induced the non-competitors in our studies to hypothesize that the 
performance levels of the competitor would be higher than had there been no competition at all; 
the hypothesized performance levels could have in turn induced an anchoring effect (3) that 
caused the non-competitors to perform better. While this alternative mechanism is driven by the 
awareness of a competition, it is not necessitated, in principle, by that awareness, but by the 
anchoring effect that follows it.  
In Study 2B, participation roles are randomly assigned within each 50-person groups - 
with half of the group being assigned to be participants and the other half being assigned to be 
non-participants; an additional incentive is present among the participants of the scheme; and 
3 
 
non-participants of the scheme might hypothesize that the participants of the scheme would 
perform better than had there been no incentive scheme, which could then induce an anchoring 
effect. As discussed in the main text, we observe no contagion effect in Study 2B. As such, we 
obtain evidence that the contagion effect in previous studies is necessitated by the awareness of a 
competition, and none of the proposed alternative mechanisms could account for it. 
 
Notes on Methods and Further Data Analysis Results 
Study 1. Formally, the treatment conditions form a 2(framing: neutral versus contest) × 
2(number of prizes: one versus seven) between-subjects design. The manipulations are as 
described in the next section of this document. 
We analyze the payment data of customers who stated they were visiting the zoo for the 
first time during the period of the experiment, and focus on the price the customer decided to pay 
for his/her own entry. As such, we screen out questionnaire respondents who, as noted by the zoo 
staff at the entrance, were not adults, and thus were relatively likely to have not made 
independent payment decisions; these respondents made up 3.14% of the pre-screening payment 
observations. The final dataset consists of a total of 22,886 payment observations from 12,076 
(52.77%) self-reported females and 10,212 (44.62%) self-reported males; the remaining 598 or 
3.61% payment observations have missing data on gender.  
Of the analyzed payment observations, 13,056 (57.05%) are from the control condition 
and 9,830 (42.95%) are from the treatment conditions. Among the latter, 1,652 are from 
customers who opted to participate in the competition, yielding a participation rate of 16.81%. 
The remaining 8,178 observations are from non-competing customers who were aware of the 
existence of an ongoing competition but were not taking part in it themselves.  
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A 2 (framing) × 2 (number of prizes) between-subjects ANOVA on non-competitors’ 
payments in the treatment conditions does not yield any significant main or interaction effects (P 
> 0.25 for the main effects; P = 0.11 for the interaction), suggesting that the contagion in our 
field experiment is robust across the treatment conditions: neither an explicit contest framing or a 
reward structure with a single prize, is needed for the contagion.  
The overall mean PWYW payment of competing consumers is 6.34 Euros (s.d. = 3.84 
Euros, 95% CI: [6.15,6.52]) across conditions, a 16.97% increase from the control that is 
statistically significant (t(14,706)=12.17,P<0.01). Participation in a competition over PWYW 
payments with prizes leads to higher payments, which is predictable from both psychological and 
economic perspectives. It is also useful to confirm that the payments of competitors are generally 
higher than those of non-competitors: aggregate comparison yields t(9,828)=6.86, P < 0.01, and 
the same conclusions hold for pairwise t-tests for each treatment condition (P < 0.01 in all 
comparisons).  
Study 2A. Formally, the treatment conditions form a 2(competition context: no 
competition versus competition) × 2(competition role: competitor versus non-competitor) × 
2(competition reward: $0.5 versus $10) mixed design, where competition context is a within-
subjects factor while competition role and competition reward are between-subjects factors. 
Section A, the first four rounds (round 1-4) of the slider task, being identically setup as in the 
control condition, form the “no competition” manipulation in terms of the within-subjects factor 
of competition context. Section B, the final two rounds (round 5-6), form the “competition” 
manipulation of the competition context factor. The other two manipulations are as described in 
the Materials and Methods. 
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Study 2B. Formally, Study 2B has a 2(incentive scheme context: no incentive scheme 
versus presence of incentive scheme) × 2(incentive scheme participation role: participant in 
scheme versus non-participant in scheme) × 2(incentive scheme reward: $0.5 versus $10) mixed 
design, where incentive scheme context is a within-subjects factor while incentive scheme 
participation role and incentive scheme reward are between-subjects factors. 
Study 3. Formally, the treatment conditions follow a 3(competition reward: $0 versus 
$0.5 versus $10) × 2(competition role: competitor versus non-competitor) between-subjects 
design. The lottery control conditions have a 2(lottery reward: $0.5 versus $10) × 2(lottery 
participation role: lottery participant versus non-lottery-participant) between-subjects design.  
As is apparent in Table 4, we managed to achieve, in two of the competitions and two of 
the lotteries, a proportion of 25%-36% participants to be competitors/lottery participants. For the 
competition with $10 reward, due to unforeseeable exhaustion of the MTurk subject pool at the 
time of execution, we ended up assigning proportionally too many participants to be competitors. 
Nevertheless, the participants were informed before the tasks (as in other conditions) that 
approximately one-third of them would be competing, and at no point during the experiment 
could they have inferred otherwise.  
Competitors’ performance scores are higher than those of non-competitors when the 
reward level was nil (reward = $0; t(134)=3.26, P < 0.01) or when the reward level was high 
(reward = $10; t(185)=3.10, P < 0.01). Both are in predictable directions; the first effect is 
especially consistent with the possibility that, even without a cash incentive, participating in a 
competition can still lead to higher performance because of social incentives of the kind 
observed in (4) and other studies. The pattern of competitors’ performance scores across reward 
levels also has a consistent U-shaped dependence although without significant statistical 
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evidence (P = 0.066 and P = 0.19 when comparing competitors’ scores at reward=$0.5 with 
reward=$0 and reward=$10, respectively). 
However, performance scores do not differ significantly by participation role when the 
reward is positive but low (reward = $0.5, P > 0.25). This is consistent with a contagion effect on 
non-competitors to the extent that non-competitors’ performance can approach that of 
competitors. Another possibility is that the low but positive reward level has an adverse effect on 
competitors as in (4): as the monetary incentive increases from no cash reward to $0.5, the 
competitors’ focus might have switched from the social to the monetary aspect of the 
competition; but the reward level is so low that the competitors did not work too hard for it.  
We find that the total performance score is positively correlated with self-reported effort 
in both the lottery (r = 0.30, P < 0.01) and the competition (r = 0.43, P < 0.01) conditions. 
Moreover, self-reported effort is positively correlated with both self-reported monetary and 
social comparison motivations in both the lottery and the competition conditions, with r > 0.2 
and P < 0.01 in all four correlations.  
Regarding the self-report measures, apart from the results reported in the main text, we 
also find that competitors’ monetary motivation increases significantly (t(89)=3.72, P < 0.01) 
when the reward level increases from nil ($0) to low ($0.5). All other related pairwise t-test 
comparisons over changes in reward levels, including in the lottery control conditions, yield non-
significant effects at P > 0.15.  
It thus seems that competitors across different reward level manipulations do not perceive 
themselves to have exerted different effort (indeed their performance scores do not differ 
significantly by reward level), but their monetary motivation increases when the reward level 
increases from $0 to $0.5, signifying a change in focus from the social to the monetary aspect of 
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the competition. However, there are no corresponding changes in the lottery control conditions, 
despite the similar reward levels. This lends further supporting evidence that the contagion effect 
is necessitated by the awareness of a competition. 
 
Instruments in the Experiments 
Manipulations and Presentation of Competition Information in Study 1. In the 
neutral frame/1 prize condition of Study 1, the customer was presented with the following 
tabulated information at the outset (edited and translated from German): 
 
Receive a Gift Card 
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive … 
… highest … 
an annual family pass to the zoo (145€)  and a 
400€ Amazon Gift Card 
 
In the contest frame/1 prize condition, the customer was instead presented with the following 
information: 
 
Customer Competition  
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive the … 
… highest … 
Winner prize: an annual family pass to the zoo 
(145€)  and a 400€ Amazon Gift Card 
 
 
In the contest frame/7 prize condition, the customer was presented with the following 
information: 
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Customer Competition  
If your payment is, among all participating 
customers’ payments … … you will receive the … 
… highest … 
Winner prize: an annual family pass to the zoo 
(145€) and a 135€ Amazon Gift Card 
…second highest… 2nd prize: a 90€ Amazon Gift Card 
…third highest… 3rd prize: a 60€ Amazon Gift Card 
…fourth highest… 4th prize: a 40€ Amazon Gift Card 
…fifth, sixth, or seventh highest… 5th prize: each a 25€ Amazon Gift Card 
 
The information presented to customers in the neutral frame/7prize condition can be inferred 
accordingly.   
Sample Real Effort Task in Study 2A, Study 2B, and Study 3. The experiments in the 
three studies were conducted using the Qualtrics interface. The following is a sample of the task 
interface for the $10-reward/non-competitor treatment condition in Study 3. It presents the main 
decision tasks as seen by subjects on their computer screens. The highlighted passages in yellow 
are as appeared in the experimental interface to ensure participants took note of key information. 
On the other hand, any text in square brackets [ ] are notes on the procedures for the purpose of 
this document, and is not part of the experimental interface. 
Instructions 
Please read the following very carefully. 
 
Please do not communicate with other participants for the entire duration of this 
study. 
 
Overview 
This study consists of 4 rounds. In each round, you will undertake an identical task 
within a time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds. 
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Every participant will receive $0.5 for his/her participation in the 4 rounds.   
 
In addition, we have randomly assigned approximately one-third of the participants 
to compete against each other in this study. The participant with the highest 
performance score among the competing participants will be the winner. The winner 
will be announced among the competing participants after the study is over. The 
winner will receive an additional reward of $10 on top of the $0.5 participation 
payment. Ties will be settled by a coin toss. 
 
[page break] 
  
Your role 
You have been assigned to be a non-competitor in this study. As such, you will not 
be competing with other similarly assigned participants for the additional $10 
reward. 
 
[page break] 
Task description  
This study consists of 4 rounds. In each round you will undertake an identical task 
within a time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 60 
sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. You 
can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust the 
position of each slider as many times as you wish.    
  
When moved, each slider will show a number indicating its current position. Your 
task is to move each slider to 50. You may drag the slider from its initial position to 
reach 50 or alternatively click at the middle of the slider bar.  Your performance 
score in the study will be the total number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 
over all of the 4 rounds.    
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[page break] 
Task results 
You will see your performance score at the end of the study. You have been 
provided a results form, which is on your desk. Once you have received your 
performance score, please write this score down on the results form along with 
your name and email address. Please leave this form on your desk. 
  
If you have further questions, please raise your hand and wait until the study 
coordinator comes over to you. 
 
Do not ask any question aloud! 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
  
Please click the button below when you are ready to begin. 
 
[page break] 
 
Round 1 of 4 
There are 60 sliders in each round. 
 
Your task is to move each slider to 50. You may drag the slider from its initial 
position to reach 50 or alternatively click at the middle of the slider bar. 
 
You have a time limit of 1 minute 15 seconds for this round. At any point during the 
1 minute 15 seconds, you can scroll to the bottom and click a button to skip to the 
next round immediately. Please note that your performance score in the study will 
be the total number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 over all 4 rounds. 
  
Please be aware that the 1 minute 15 seconds timer begins when you click the 
button. 
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[page break] 
Round 1 of 4 
  
As stated earlier, you can use the mouse in any way you like to move each 
slider. You can readjust the position of each slider as many times as you wish. 
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This round ends when the 1 minute 15 seconds time limit is over, or when you 
click the button at the bottom to skip to the next round. Your performance 
score in this round will be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 when it 
ends. 
 
[There were 60 sliders in the task. Subsequent rounds had the same set up.] 
 
  
13 
 
SI References 
1. Bornstein G, Erev I (1994) The enhancing effect of intergroup competition on group 
performance. Int J Confl Manage 5:271-184.  
2. Lount RB Jr, Phillips KW (2007) Working harder with the out-group: The impact of social 
category diversity on motivation gains. Organ Behav Hum Dec 103:214-224.  
3. Tversky A, Kahneman D (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science 
185:1124-1131.  
4. Heyman J, Ariely D (2004) Effort for payment: A tale of two markets. Psychol Sci 15:787-
793. 
 
 
 
